We present a proxy signature scheme using bilinear pairings that provides effective proxy revocation. The scheme uses a binding-blinding technique to avoid secure channel requirements in the key issuance stage. With this technique, the signer receives a partial private key from a trusted authority and unblinds it to get his private key, in turn, overcomes the key escrow problem which is a constraint in most of the pairing-based proxy signature schemes. The scheme fulfills the necessary security requirements of proxy signature and resists other possible threats.
Introduction
Proxy signature is a digital signature where an original signer delegates his signing capability to a proxy signer, and then the proxy signer performs message signing on behalf of the original signer. The notion of proxy signature has been evolved over a long time, 16 years now [1] . However, the cryptographic treatment on proxy signature was introduced by Mambo et al [2] in 1996. They classified the delegation capability in three types, namely full delegation, partial delegation and delegation by warrant. In full delegation, an original signer directly gives his private key to a proxy signer and using it the proxy signer signs the document. The drawback of proxy signature with full delegation is that the absence of a distinguishability between the original signer and the proxy signer. In partial delegation, the original signer derives a proxy key from his private key and hands it over to the proxy signer as a delegation of signing rights. In this case, the proxy signer can misuse the delegation of signing rights, because partial delegation does not restrict the proxy signer's signing capability. The weakness of full and partial delegations are eliminated by partial delegation with warrant, where a warrant explicitly states the signers' identity, delegation period and the qualification of the message on which the proxy signer can sign, etc. Once proxy delegation is given, the revocation is an important issue in the proxy signature scheme. For instance, the original signer key is compromised or any misuse of delegation of signing rights is noticed. It may so happen that the original signer wants to terminate his delegation power before the expiry e.g., the manager of a company has come back from his trip before time that he was scheduled for. Desirable security properties of proxy signatures have evolved over this period and a widely accepted list of required properties are as follows: -Strong unforgeability: A designated proxy signer can create a valid proxy signature on behalf of the original signer. But the original signer and other third parties cannot create a valid proxy signature.
-Strong identifiability: Anyone can determine the identity of the corresponding proxy signer from the proxy signature.
-Verifiability: The verifier can be convinced of the original signer's agreement from the proxy signature.
-Distinguishability: Proxy signatures are distinguishable from normal signatures by everyone.
-Strong undeniability: Once a proxy signer creates a valid proxy signature, he cannot deny the signature creation.
-Prevention of misuse: The proxy signer cannot use the proxy key for other purposes than it is made for. That is, he cannot sign message with the proxy key that have not been defined in the warrant. If he does so, he will be identified explicitly from the warrant.
After Mambo et al.'s [2] scheme, several schemes have been proposed [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] . However, most of the schemes lack proxy revocation mechanism. Recently, the bilinear pairings, namely the Weil pairing and the Tate pairing of algebraic curves have been found important applications [8] , [9] , [10] in identity(ID) based cryptography. The advantage of an ID-based cryptography [11] is that it avoids public key certification, the public key of a user is his identity, e.g., e-mail, social security number, etc. There are a few proxy signature schemes [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] based on bilinear pairings; however, the schemes lack the key escrow problem and have not addressed the proxy revocation mechanism. In this paper, we present a proxy signature scheme using bilinear pairings that provides effective proxy revocation mechanism. Our scheme is not exactly ID-based, it is a variant of ID-based schemes. The scheme does not require secure channel in the key issuance stage and avoids the key escrow problem. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some preliminaries. Section 3 presents the scheme. Section 4 analyzes the security and performance of the scheme. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
Preliminaries

Bilinear Pairings
Suppose G 1 is a cyclic additive group of prime order q, generated by P , and G 2 is a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q. A mapê :
called a bilinear mapping if it satisfies the following properties: -Bilinear:ê(aP, bQ) =ê(P, Q) ab for all P, Q ∈ G 1 and a, b ∈ Z * q ; -Non-degenerate: There exist P, Q ∈ G 1 such thatê(P, Q) = 1 ; -Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to computeê(P, Q) ∀ P, Q ∈ G 1 . In general, G 1 is a group of points on an elliptic curve and G 2 is a multiplicative subgroup of a finite field.
Computational Problems
Definition 1. Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) : Given Q, R ∈ G 1 , find an integer a ∈ Z * q such that R = aQ. Definition 2. Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP) : Given (P, aP, bP, cP ) for a, b, c ∈ Z * q , determine whether c ≡ ab mod q. The advantage Adv of any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A in solving DDHP in G 1 is defined as:
For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, Adv 
For every probabilistic algorithm A, Adv 
The Proposed Scheme
To avoid the original signer's forgery and prevention of delegation power misuse, the proxy-protected proxy signature [3] is a secure approach. Our scheme is based on proxy-protected notion and uses the merits of partial delegation with warrant 1 . The participating entities and their roles in the proposed scheme are defined as follows:
• Private Key Generator (PKG): A trusted authority who receives signer's identity (ID) along with other parameters, checks validity of ID and issues partial private key to the signer corresponding to the ID.
• Original Signer: Entity who delegates his signing rights to a proxy signer.
• Proxy Signer: Entity who signs the message on behalf of the original signer.
• Verifier: Entity who verifies the proxy signature and decides to accept or reject.
The scheme has five phases: Setup, KeyGen, ProxyKeyGen, ProxySignGen and ProxySignVerify. The phases work as follows.
[ Setup ] It takes as input a security parameter; and outputs system parameters params and master-key of PKG. The params includes a cyclic additive group G 1 of prime order q generated by P , a cyclic multiplicative group G 2 of prime order q, a bilinear map e :
, and public key of PKG. The PKG selects a master-key s ∈ Z * q and computes public key as P ub P KG = sP . The PKG publishes params = (G 1 , G 2 ,ê, q, P, P ub P KG , H 1 , H 2 , h) and keeps s secret.
[ KeyGen ] It takes user chosen parameters and params as inputs; and outputs user private key. The entire phase consists of a partial private key issuance and a private key generation stages. The stages use a binding-blinding technique to avoid the key escrow problem and to eliminate the secure channel requirements. The bindingblinding technique works as follows:
-The user chooses two secret binding factors, calculates the binding parameters and sends them to the PKG over a public channel along with his/her identity.
-As the communication channel between the user and the PKG is a public channel, a dishonest party can construct his/her preferred binding parameters using the targeted user's identity and sends the binding parameters along with user's identity before the user submits a request for partial private key.
To avoid this type of attack, the PKG first sends a message to the email-id 2 (email-id acts as the user identity) and asks a confirmation from the email-id owner. If the email-id owner confirms his/her request for a partial private key, then the PKG proceeds to the next step.
-The PKG checks the validity of binding parameters. Upon successful validation of the parameters, the PKG computes signer partial private key. Then, the PKG sends the partial private key to the user in a blinding manner over the public channel.
PartialPrivateKey issuance:
-User U λ computes his own public key P ub λ = H 2 (ID λ ).
-U λ picks two secret binding factors a λ , b λ ∈ Z * q and computes
to the PKG over a public channel.
-Once the ID λ is correct (we assume that identity of the user is his/her emailid and unregistered identity attack can be avoided by the above mentioned email confirmation procedure), the PKG computes P ub λ = H 2 (ID λ ) and verifies the validity of ID λ by whetherê(Y λ , P ) =ê(X λ , Z λ ) =ê(P ub λ , W λ ).
-The PKG computes U λ 's partial private key as D λ = sY λ and creates a registration-token Reg λ = sZ λ corresponding to ID λ . Then, PKG publishes (Reg λ , ID λ ) in a public directory and sends D λ to U λ over a public channel.
We note that the PKG controls the public directory and checks every request before issuance of any partial private key. If the identity is present in the directory, the PKG denies the request, thereby the registration-token replacement is not possible by any other party.
PrivateKey generation:
-On receiving the partial private key D λ , the signer U λ checks its correctness by whetherê(D λ , P ) =ê(Y λ , P ub P KG ). If D λ is valid, U λ unblinds it and generates his private key as
Original signer private key: Let ID o be the identity of an original signer. The original signer chooses binding secret factors a o and b o and runs the KeyGen algorithm to get his partial private key as
. After validating D p , the proxy signer generates his private key as
-The original signer and proxy signer agree on a warrant m w .
-The original signer computes
sends the tuple (m w , U o , ψ o , P ub o ) to the proxy signer over a public channel as the delegation capability.
-The proxy signer checks whether e(U o , P ) =ê(ψ o , H 1 (m w , P ub o , P ub p ))ê(P ub o , Reg o ).
-If the delegation capability is valid, the proxy signer computes proxy key as
[ ProxySignGen ]
To sign a message m, the proxy signer computes the following steps:
-Select a random r ∈ Z * q and computes R = rP .
-Compute a = h(m, R, P ub p ) and ψ p = b p P .
The proxy signature on m is the tuple (m w , m, R, V, ψ o , ψ p , P ub o , P ub p ).
[ ProxySignVerify ]
The proxy signature (m w , m, R, V, ψ o , ψ p , P ub o , P ub p ) is valid if and only if
4 Analysis of the Scheme
Correctness of proxy signature verification
e(R + h(m, R, P ub p )P, V ) =ê((r + h(m, R, P ub p ))P, (r + a)
Security Analysis
In this section, we show that the proposed scheme satisfies the security properties of a proxy signature, mentioned in Section 1. In addition, the scheme withstands some other possible threats. The scheme can withstand the strong unforgeability security property. To create a valid proxy signature, one should need the original signer and proxy signer private keys. Though the adversary can intercept signer partial private key D i ( i.e., sa i b i P ub i ), he cannot construct the private key S i (i.e., sb i P ub i ) without the knowledge of a i , because it is a WDHP (definition 5) which is assumed to be a hard problem. As our scheme is proxy protected, i.e., the proxy signer has to use his private key and original signer's delegation power to sign a message, thus, the original signer is also prohibited from forging a valid proxy signature. Moreover, the PKG cannot frame the signers' with the knowledge of binding parameters (X i , Y i , Z i , W i ), as extracting the binding factors a i , b i from the binding parameters is as hard as CDHP (definition 3). The scheme can resist the identifiability, undeniability and distinguishability security properties. A valid proxy signature of a message m is the tuple (m w , m, R, V , ψ o , ψ p , P ub o , P ub p ). The public keys P ub o , P ub p and warrant m w are the straightforward witnesses (i.e., identities) of the signers. In addition, a verifier will come to know the agreement between original and proxy signers from m w . From the correctness of the proxy signature, given in Section 4.1, it is clear that the proxy signer cannot deny his signature creation. The verification of a valid proxy signature needs the proxy signer's public key, in turn, proves that the signature was created by the proxy signer. Further, the PKG can also prove the identity of the proxy signer, as the tuple (Reg p , ID p ) in the PKG public directory is a supporting identification of a proxy signer and is also required in the proxy signature verification phase. Any verifier will receive the proxy signature that contains warrant m w and the public key of signers, by which the verifier can easily distinguish the proxy signature from the normal signature. The scheme is secure against misuse of the proxy delegation. In the Proxy key generation phase, the original signer signs the tuple (m w , P ub o , P ub p ) and gives it to the proxy signer as his delegation capability. The proxy signer signs a message with the proxy key that is being created by his private key and original signer's delegation capability. The qualification of message and limitation of proxy is clearly defined in m w and the delegation is made for the designated proxy signer only. If the proxy signer misused the delegation capability, the proxy signer will be detected by any verifier from m w . The original signer's misuse is also prevented because he cannot create a valid proxy signature against the name of the proxy signer. Apart from the above security properties, the scheme withstands the following possible threats. Threat 1. Registration-token replacement : The PKG creates registration-token corresponding to each registered signer and publishes it along with signer-ID in a public directory, which is controlled by PKG only. If a request comes from signer identity ID * for issuance of a partial private key, the PKG first checks whether ID * is in the public directory. If it is found in the public directory, the PKG rejects the request, otherwise executes the KeyGen algorithm for ID * . Thus, the registration-token replacement is not possible by any party (the PKG itself can replace the registration-token, but we assume that the signer trusts PKG for not to do it). Threat 2. Man-in-the-middle attacks : In our scheme, the communication channel of the key issuance stage is a public channel, thus an attacker may try to calculate the private key or binding factors of a signer by intercepting the binding parameters and partial private key. On intercepting the binding parameters, the adversary can formulate the following problem : Given params, binding parameters (a i P ub i , a i b i P ub i , b i P , a i b i P , ID i ) and partial private key D i (i.e., sa i b i P ub i ); Compute private key S i (i.e. sb i P ub i ) or binding factors (a i , b i ). To solve this problem, one has to solve either the CDHP or the WDHP, which is assumed to be computationally hard. Threat 3. ONE partial private key → MANY private keys : The scenario of generating more than one private key from a partial private key is nor possible, because the private key S i (i.e. sb i P ub i ) and the registration-token Reg i are linked by the secret binding factor b i . If a signer generates another private S * i from S i and signs a message by S * i , then the verification of the signature fails because the change from S i to S * i is not reflected in Reg i . Thereby, the signer cannot perform this type of attempt without being detected. Theorem 1. The proxy signature scheme is said to be secure against adaptive chosen-massage attacks under random oracle model if no polynomially bounded adversary (in k) has non-negligible advantage (in k). Proof : The proof of the theorem is ascertained by the following challenger-adversary game. Setup: A challenger C takes a security parameter k and runs the Setup phase as mentioned in Section 3. Then C returns the resulting system parameters params to A and keeps master-key s with itself. Queries: The adversary A issues adaptively the queries q 1 , q 2 , · · · , q m in any order for the following: ProxyKeyGen query on P ub j , where j = 1, · · · , m: C runs the ProxyKeyGen phase and generates proxy key V j using S j and b j corresponding to P ub j , and sends it to A. ProxySignGen query on (P ub j , M ′ ): C runs the ProxyKeyGen phase and generates the proxy key V j . Then, C signs the message M ′ and returns the proxy signature (ω,
Guess: A outputs a proxy signature for message M * , where M * did not appear in the ProxySignGen query. Result: A wins if his produced proxy signature on M * is valid. The advantage of A in attacking the scheme is defined to be the probability that A produces a valid proxy signature in the game. We say that our scheme is secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks under random oracle model if no polynomially bounded adversary has non-negligible advantage in this game.
Performance
Proxy revocation : The revocation of delegation capability (i.e., proxy revocation) is an important concern in any proxy signature scheme. It is observed that the schemes [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] have not addressed the proxy revocation issues, which is a practical requirement. In our scheme, proxy revocation can be easily done by revoking the registration-token from the PKG's public directory. If the original signer wants to revoke his delegation of signing rights, he sends a revokerequest tuple (M r , m w , Rev, P ub o , P ub p , ψ o ) to the PKG and proxy signer, where Rev = S o + b o H 1 (M r , P ub o , P ub p ) and M r states the identity of the signer along with the reason for proxy revocation. The PKG first checks the authenticity and validity of the revoke-request and if the request is valid then PKG revokes the tuple (Reg o , ID o ) and (Reg p , ID p ) from the public directory. We note that the proxy signer will not object if the PKG removes (Reg p , ID p ) without his consent (the original consent is with PKG), because if the delegation capability is no longer authorized, the delegated proxy signer is no longer required. The PKG validates the revoke-request as follows:
e(Rev, P ) =ê(S o + b o H 1 (M r , P ub o , P ub p ), P ) =ê(sb o P ub o + b o H 1 (M r , P ub o , P ub p ), P ) =ê(Reg o , P ub o )ê(H 1 (M r , P ub o , P ub p ), ψ o )
Key escrow : In our scheme, the PKG issues a PartialPrivateKey to the signer and with this the signer computes his private key. The PKG is not having knowledge of signer private key. To construct a private key from the partial private key, one has to know the secret binding factor or has to solve DLP. As the binding factor is retained with the signer only, other party can not obtain signer private key because solving DLP is a hard problem. Thus, our scheme avoid the key escrow problem, which occurs in the schemes [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] No need of secure channel : To eliminate the secure channel in the key issuance stage, we used a binding-blinding technique where the signer requests for a partial private key from the PKG. We considered a simplest procedure to verify the genuineness of signer's identity while partial private key issuance. After validating the signer request, the PKG issues a partial private key in a blinded manner. Finally, the signer unblinds the partial private key to get his private key. This binding-blinding technique avoids the secure channel in the key issuance stage.
